Truck manufacturers in Europe: collusive businesses and markets, and an approach to estimating economic impact
Journal
ESIC Market
ISSN
0212-1867
Date Issued
2026-03-31
Author(s)
Cobo Ruiz, Sara
Martin Martin, José María
Puertas Medina, Rosa
Abstract
Objective and interest of the work: This research proposes a replicable methodology to quantify the economic impact of cartels, focusing on the European truck manufacturers’ cartel (1997–2011), one of the largest in scope and financial penalties in EU history (€3.8B). The case involves six major medium and heavy truck manufacturers in the European Economic Area, whose coordinated actions caused severe market distortions and significant harm to road freight transport companies.Methodology: Due to the lack of reliable public data on actual truck prices, the study introduces an innovative approach: annual depreciation allowances (ada) as a proxy for medium and heavy truck prices. Data from 30,000 Spanish transport firms (1992–2015) were analysed via fixed-effects regression models accounting for revenue quartiles, macro-economic indicators and the period during which the cartel was active.Results: The cartel resulted in an average price overcharge of 18%. The effect was dispro-portionately higher for smaller companies. Those operating one or two trucks experienced overcharges of up to 27%. These findings highlight the role of firm size and bargaining power in determining the extent of damage caused by collusion.Limitations: The study is limited to the Spanish market and does not rely on direct price observations. Nonetheless, ada offers a robust alternative given the data constraints.Practical implications: This methodological proposal offers policymakers and competition authorities a scalable tool to estimate economic harm in cartelised markets. It provides insight into the distributional effects of anticompetitive practices, especially on smaller firms, and supports proportional sanctioning based on firm-level impact.